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COMMENTS
PLEA BARGAINING: A NECESSARY EVIL?
Nancy McDonough
Refusal by the Honorable G. Thomas Eisele,, a federal district
judge in Arkansas, to accept negotiated pleas in his court' has raised
an age-old question: How necessary is plea bargaining' to our system
1. In Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement, United States
v. Griffin (Chambers & Yielding), No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark., entered Dec. 29, 1978), Judge
Eisele stated:
Pending before the Court is the motion of the defendant Charles Yielding and
the government to set a date certain to present to the Court the plea agreement
which has been struck between the parties in this case. It is not now, nor has it been,
the practce of this Court to consider such agreements, even though the Court is
cognizant of the provisions of Rule 11(e), Rules of Criminal Procedure, which make
such consideration optional.
(footnotes omitted).
2. The Griffin case to which Judge Eisele referred in the above memorandum began in
July of 1977 when Charles Thomas Griffin and two other individuals, Charles E. Yielding and
Joe Henry Chambers, were indicted for alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1006. On
September 15, 1978, Yielding filed a motion, under Rule 11(e) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, asking the district court to set a date and time certain for the disclosure and
presentation of the negotiated plea between Yielding and the Government. On September 18,
1978, the Government filed a Response to this Motion, joining Yielding in the request that
the district court enter a Memorandum and Order denying the Motion to Hear Plea Agree-
ment, pointing out that this particular judge categorically refuses to hear plea agreements.
On January 4, 1979, Yielding filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and on January 5, 1979, the
district court held a hearing, again denying the request that the plea agreement be heard.
On January 31, 1979, Yielding filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1651 ("All Writs Act"). In re Yielding, No. 79-1093 (8th Cir., filed Jan. 24, 1979).
Petitioner asked the court of appeals to direct the district court to hear the plea agreement
and to exercise discretion in deciding whether to accept it.
3. A simple definition of plea bargaining has been given in the President's Task Force
Report:
The plea agreement follows several patterns. In its best known form it is an
arrangement between the prosecutor and the defendant or his lawyer whereby the
accused pleads guilty to a charge less serious than could be proven at trial. 'Less
serious' in this context usually means an offense which carries a lower maximum
sentence. The defendant's motivation is to confine the upper limits of the judge's
sentencing power. Similar results are obtained when the plea is entered in return
for the prosecutor's agreement to drop counts in a multicount indictment or not to
charge the defendant as a habitual offender.
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force
Report: The Courts 10-11 (1967).
It should be noted that Judge Eisele specifically excluded from his ban the practice of
"count" bargaining, giving as his reason that the court "has not found an appropriate way
to prevent this practice."
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of justice? Most prosecutors and some defense counsel defend the
plea bargaining process; many commentators and judges denounce
it.' Others simply recognize it as a practical necessity.' An attorney
with an apparently guilty client may be tempted to "beg, bargain,
and barter"' at the first opportunity, but he should ask himself
whether this method of "trying"7 a case best serves the public inter-
est, our legal system, or even the particular client.
Leon Jaworski has referred to the plea bargaining process as "a
subject misunderstood by many. . . ."I This lack of understanding
is hard to comprehend when one realizes that plea negotiating origi-
nated in tribal society and has been a part of the adjudicative
process since that time. The negative attitude of many individuals
toward the plea bargaining process is probably due to the fact that
most of its existence has been sub rosa, with recognition and ap-
proval of the process surfacing only in recent years. The desire and
drive to bring plea discussions into the open prompted the 1975
4. Plea bargaining has had more than its share of critics through the years, including a
Fifth Circuit judge who stated "Justice and liberty are not the subjects of bargaining and
barter." Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957).
The practice, however, has finally been condoned by both the United States Supreme
Court and the American Bar Association. The Supreme Court defended it in a 1971 case
wherein the Court stated: "The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the
prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining,' is an essential compo-
nent of the administration of Justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged." Santo-
bello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). The A.B.A. agreed in 1974, when it noted:
The process of plea discussion serves important social interests and . . is one
of the most important functions of both prosecution and defense counsel ...
Properly conducted, plea discussion may well produce a result approximating
closely, but informally and more swiftly, the result which ought to ensue from a
trial, while avoiding most of the undesirable aspects of that ordeal.
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Compilation 78-79
(1974).
5. It may have been this yiew that prompted the holding in Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257 (1971). The Supreme Court conceded therein that "If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply
by many times the number of judges and court facilities." Id. at 260.
6. Judge Levin's expression in People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 162 N.W.2d 777, 780
(1968).
7. The relationship of the plea bargaining process to a trial of the case seems to be
reflected in this statute:
Upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to an information or indictment, the
plea may specify the punishment to the same extent as it may be specified by the
jury on a plea of not guilty or fixed by the court on a plea of guilty . ...
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
8. Jaworski, The Most Lustrous Branch: Watergate and the Judiciary, 45 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1267, 1270 (1977).
9. Comment, People v. Selikoff: The Route to Rational Plea Bargaining, 21 CATH. LAW.
144, 145 n.6 (1975).
COMMENTS
amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 11 provides that if a plea agreement is reached by the parties
the court shall require the disclosure of the agreement on the record
in open court at the time the plea is offered.'0 Construction of the
word "shall" in that rule has resulted in controversy over whether
a federal judge is required under Rule 11 to allow the presentation
of plea agreements in his court for acceptance or rejection."
For every person who cites a benefit of the plea bargaining
process, there is another who claims an abuse. Since the guilty plea
accounts for approximately ninety-five percent of all criminal con-
victions in the United States, 2 it is important to consider the posi-
tive and negative aspects of negotiating plea agreements and the
impact such bargaining has on all of the parties involved in the
process. The most obvious benefit is the savings in time and expense
to the parties, the court, and the public. As criminal trials become
more expensive and time-consuming and court dockets become
more crowded,'3 "back room" decisions which speed up the adju-
dicative process'4 and reduce costs to all parties have become more
appealing. 1
In numerous cases the defendant may benefit from the plea
bargaining process." If the defendant is guilty of the offense with
10. FED. R. CIuM. P. ll(e)(2). This section provides, however, that the agreement may
be disclosed in camera on a showing of good cause.
11. As Judge Eisele's attorney summed up the controversy: "The one fact which rises
undisputed from the record, the briefs of the parties and the authorities cited therein is this:
reasonable men may disagree on the wisdom of plea bargaining." Brief for Respondent at 16,
In re Yielding, No. 79-1093 (8th Cir. 1979).
12. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1974 Amendment).
13. Judge Eisele responded to this point by stating: "[Tihere can be no significant
delay in the disposition of criminal cases in the federal system based on clogged dockets. If
the Constitution were not enough, we have the Speedy Trial Act." Memorandum and Order
Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement at 7, United States v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D.
Ark. 1978).
14. See Note, Plea Bargaining & the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 564 (1977).
15. Id. at 572.
16. Since the guilty plea results in conviction, it is the defendant who must decide
whether his case will be bargained or not. This is clearly stated in the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure: "Defense counsel shall conclude a plea agreement only with the consent
of the defendant and shall ensure that the decision whether to enter a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere is ultimately made by the defendant." ARK. R. CFUM. P. 25.2 (1977).
Federal courts also require that any plea entered by the defendant be made knowingly
and voluntarily. These requirements are spelled out in the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure 11(c) and (d). Specifically, 11(d) states: "The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, deter-
mining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart
from a plea agreement." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
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which he is charged and is confident that the prosecution has suffi-
cient evidence to prove his guilt, there is the probability that he will
receive a lighter sentence if he pleads guilty to a lesser offense. A
reduction in charges also results in the appearance of a less serious
criminal record than the defendant's conduct may have warranted.
These are the considerations which persuade most criminal defen-
dants to bargain.'7
There are the other benefits of perhaps lesser value to the defen-
dant. By "copping a plea" the defendant and his family are spared
the spotlight of a public trial and the emotional trauma that such
a trial may inflict. Furthermore, the outcome of the defendant's
case is settled in advance of trial and his fate is not subject to the
uncertainties of a jury decision. If the bargain is not one with which
the defendant is satisfied he may, of course, reject it and insist that
he be tried.
The prosecutor may benefit as much or even more than the
defendant from the plea bargaining process. The prosecutor is faced
with the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt. Due to constitutional restraints which are guar-
anteed the defendant, it may be impossible for the prosecutor to
convict even the guiltiest defendant at trial." In such a situation the
prosecutor is generally willing to bargain in order to obtain a certain
conviction on a lesser offense. In further support of plea bargaining
agreements, one district court has noted: "A defendant who enters
a plea affords the government an opportunity to insure prompt and
certain application of correctional measures while avoiding the costs
and uncertainties of a trial."'"
17. Donald Newman explains that the most sought after concession is charge reduction,
since:
In general, this is the best all-round bargain from the defendant's point of view
because it results in a less serious record than is warranted by the defendant's
conduct, the avoidance of any mandatory sentencing provisions applicable to the
original charge, and whatever intrinsic sentencing benefit is brought by the guilty
plea.
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GuiLT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 97
(1966).
18. It has been noted that:
[Ilf the state has misused its power in the process of investigating or prosecuting
the defendant, it is often denied a conviction because evidence obtained illegally is
excluded from the trial. But since these exclusionary rules which control law en-
forcement agencies are effective only at trial, plea bargaining undermines their
impact.
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1396 (1970) (foot-
notes omitted).
19. United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629, 633 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
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Plea bargaining often results in the production of witnesses for
the government:
[I]t has been established beyond peradventure that plea
agreements, properly conducted, greatly help the cause of law en-
forcement. Defendants who have received a sentence concession of
some sort testify regularly in criminal trials across the country.
When a Court absolutely refuses to hear plea agreements, it often
forces the prosecutor either to grant immunity to a suspect, or
forego prosecution of conspiring defendants. 0
The plea agreement may include a promise by the defendant to
testify against a codefendant, to debrief in the presence of govern-
ment agents, or to assist in undercover work for the purpose of
aiding the government in the discovery of others engaged in criminal
enterprises." The ability to deliver a reduction in charges in ex-
change for the cooperation of the defendant gives the prosecutor
great leverage in the adjudicative process and boosts his conviction
record as well.
An additional party that benefits from plea bargaining is the
public.22 The public has a continuing interest in the courts' saving
of time and expense. The public also benefits from plea bargaining
in that a guilty plea immediately removes from the streets a poten-
tially dangerous individual who is out of jail on bail. It is beyond
dispute that the entire legal system benefits from the relief of court
congestion. A New York judge noted that, "[I]n budget-starved
urban criminal courts, the negotiated plea literally staves off col-
lapse of the law enforcement system, not just as to the courts but
also the local detention facilities. ' 2 3 This consideration, however,
20. Petitioner's Brief at 23, In re Yielding, No. 79-1093 (8th Cir. 1979).
21. D. NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 95. These bargains are often made with minor narcot-
ics sellers to "get to the man at the top" in a concession known as "trading the little ones for
the big ones."
For a further discussion of the value of this cooperation with the government, see Adler-
stein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors, and Federal Courts: Some Recent Problems, 6 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 755 (1978). It is commonly believed that a defendant who can offer information
against others is in a better bargaining position than those who acted alone. However, Mr.
Adlerstein believes that "[Tihe defendant who engages in crime with others may be in a
difficult position: No attractive plea will be offered by the prosecutor unless the defendant
turns in his fellow criminals." Id. at 782.
22. The Arkansas rules on "Plea Discussions and Plea Agreements" begin with this
statement:
In cases in which it appears that it would serve the interest of the public in
the effective administration of justice, the prosecuting attorney may engage in plea
discussions for the purpose of reaching a plea agreement.
ARK. R. CRIM. P. 25.1 (1977) (emphasis added).
23. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d 784, 788 (1974).
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may not be as conclusive in Arkansas as in New York. Judge Eisele
has refuted the "congested docket" argument:
It has been said that without plea bargaining the wheels of
justice would grind to a halt and that efficient administration of
the courts require the use of plea agreements. This Court doubts
the factual basis for this argument in the federal court context. It
has been able to handle its criminal docket expeditiously, and has
not found clear-cut evidence that there is any great disparity in the
percentage of its criminal cases which proceed to trial, when com-
pared to courts in other districts which do accept plea agree-
ments.2
One especially concerned member of the public is the victim.
The effect of the plea bargain on the victim has met with opposing
arguments. One writer has stated unequivocally: "Most members of
the public abhor it [plea bargaining] and regard it as bargaining
away the interest of society in protection from crime. Particularly
those who are victims of crime hold this view. 2 5 A leading commen-
tator on negotiated pleas sees it differently:
The victim of a crime is often as reluctant to be exposed to
the publicity and trauma of a trial as is the perpetrator. The guilty
plea is quick and relatively anonymous. Not only are the details
of the crime largely kept from public view, but there is ordinarily
minimal interference with the daily routines of complainant and
witnesses.26
The committee that adopted Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure apparently agreed with this latter view. The commit-
tee declared: "A plea of guilty avoids the necessity of a public trial
and may protect the innocent victim of a crime against the trauma
of direct and cross-examination.
'27
24. Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement at 6, United
States v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1978). Judge Eisele's argument is sustained by
the experience of the Maricopa County, Arizona, prosecutor's office. The prosecutor in that
county eliminated plea bargaining for a number of felonies and found that "A ban on plea
bargaining failed to cause the widely feared increase of trials in court." Berger, The Case
Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621, 623 (1976). In reporting the experiment, which
began in 1971 with a ban on bargaining of narcotics charges and expanded into a full-scale
ban on plea bargaining, the county attorney stated: "It was assumed that since there was no
plea bargaining, these defendants would go to trial in most cases. This was not the case. In
a majority of the cases the defendant pleaded guilty to the charges, and a trial was not
necessary." Id. at 623.
25. Id. at 621.
26. D. NEWMAN, supra note 17, at 96.
27. FE. R. CiuM. P. 11 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1974 Amendment).
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Along with the benefits, however, there are abuses inherent in
the plea bargaining process. Judge Eisele made his view of plea
bargaining clear when he refused to hear the plea agreement in
United States v. Griffin (the Yielding plea) :2
8
It is the Court's opinion, probably a minority opinion, that the
process of negotiating pleas has a tendency to demean all partici-
pants: the attorneys, the defendant, and even the Court. There are
'backroom' sinister implications (albeit unjustified) which simply
cannot be removed. The result: public cynicism and lack of faith
in the integrity of the judicial process.
29
The defense attorney's role in plea bargaining has been exam-
ined by one writer 30 who interviewed defense attorneys concerning
their views on so-called "pleaders" or "cop-out lawyers."' 3' Respon-
ses from the attorneys included such scathing remarks as: "The
practice of criminal law is just a little above shop-lifting in this city
[Boston]" and (in Houston) "[A]t least half of all defense attor-
neys never take a case intending to prepare for trial. 13 2 The author
concluded that the plea bargaining system provides "extraordinary
opportunities for dishonest lawyers" because it is conducted behind
closed doors and is not subject to review "by the people who pay for
it or anyone else." He seems to concur with Judge Eisele's opinion
when he says that: "[A] system in which all or most cases went to
trial would probably offer fewer opportunities for abuse."34
Most of the abuses inherent in the bargaining process have an
adverse impact on the defendant. The process may result in waivers
by defendants of their constitutional rights, involuntary pleas en-
tered by defendants, unequal representation by counsel, the threat
28. Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement, United States
v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1978). United States v. Griffin was the first step in
the series of events that led to the Yielding petition. See the outline of these motions supra
note 2.
29. Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement at 3, United
States v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
30. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. J. 1179
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Alschuler].
31. This phrase refers to those members of the bar who urge their clients to plead guilty
regardless of the circumstances of the case. They are also referred to as "quick-buck artists"
and "hangers-on of the criminal bar." Not all plea bargains are made by lawyers who fear
trial, however. Judge Eisele listed this fear as one of the factors that encouraged plea negotia-
tions, but made it clear that neither attorney in the Griffin case fell into the category of those
who were afraid to go to trial.
32. Alschuler, supra note 30, at 1185.




of unequal sentencing, and the possibility that the guilty pleas will
be entered by innocent defendants. Consideration should be given
to whether bringing pleas out of the back room and into the court
room will prevent the proliferation of such abuses. There is no doubt
that the amendments to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were designed to effect this goal.
35
When a defendant chooses to plead guilty rather than go to
trial, he relinquishes several privileges guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.36 Specifically, the defendant compromises his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, his right to a trial by jury, and his
right to confront his accusers.37 Furthermore, when a defendant en-
ters a guilty plea the government is relieved from its burden of
proving its case to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Due to the
fundamental nature of the rights which the defendant waives when
he enters a guilty plea, Rule 11(c) requires the court to advise the
defendant of these rights before the plea is accepted. This is an
attempt to make certain that the defendant's waivers are knowingly
made.38
In denying the Yielding plea bargain, Judge Eisele made the
following observation: "We always get back to it: when is a plea
voluntarily made? The plea 'taken to avoid the risk of being con-
victed of a more serious crime . . . is truly no more voluntary than
is the choice of the rock to avoid the whirlpool.' ,,3" Often the right
to reject a plea is more illusory than real. As stated by one commen-
tator: "Fear of heavier sentence after trial and deference to advice
of defense counsel might lead defendants to accept virtually all plea
agreements, thereby impairing, at least in a pragmatic sense, the
voluntariness of the guilty plea."4 The truth of this observation is
evidenced by a United States Supreme Court holding that gave rise
35. The committee admitted past defects in plea bargaining and its intention to cure
them:
In the past, plea discussions and agreements have occurred in an informal and
largely invisible manner. . . . There has often been a ritual of denial that any
promises have been made, a ritual in which judges, prosecutors, and defense coun-
sel have participated ...
The procedure described in subdivision (e) is designed to prevent abuse of plea
discussions and agreements by providing appropriate and adequate safeguards.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1974 Amendment).
36. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
37. Id. at 243.
38. FED. R. CriM. P. 11(c).
39. Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement at 8, United
States v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1978).




to the term "Alford plea." In North Carolina v. Alford4' the Court
held that a plea of guilty accompanied by protestations of innocence
is not so indicative of coercion and involuntariness as to invalidate
the plea. 42 The dictates of Rule 11 were intended to aid the court in
making certain that a defendant's plea is truly voluntary.1
3
It has been noted that "[t]he presence on the scene of a com-
petent and aggressive defense counsel can decrease the likelihood of
conviction. Some defense attorneys are of the opinion that prosecu-
tors are more likely to reduce charges if a lawyer with a 'good trial
reputation' is employed by a defendant."" This may result in une-
qual representation for defendants who participate in the plea bar-
gaining process. Defendants who can afford to hire an experienced
defense attorney may receive better bargains and lesser sentences
based solely on the skill and reputation of the attorney rather than
the actual merits of the case.
It is the unsophisticated and less affluent defendant who is
most seriously handicapped by inadequate representation. Such an
individual may frequently defer to his attorney's advice without
questioning the bargain. Often, he is represented by an overbur-
dened public defender, by an appointed attorney who may be less
than enthusiastic about his appointment, or perhaps by a "cop out"
lawyer whose primary purpose in pleading his client is to avoid a
jury trial. He also may be an indigent who is unable to raise bail
and therefore faces lengthy incarceration while awaiting trial. The
question arises whether these defendants are better off with plea
bargaining or with trial. It has been suggested that a trial on the
merits alleviates or at least lessens the impact of this disparity
between prosecutor and defense counsel. 5
41. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
42. Id. at 38.
43. FED. R. CraM. P. 11(d). See also note 16 supra.
44. D. NEwMAN, supra note 17, at 74.
45. Throughout the Yielding briefs there is a dialogue on the impact of "unequal repre-
sentation" on the plea bargaining process: Judge Eisele:
Inasmuch as plea bargaining provides leeway for a strong prosecutor to over-
whelm a poorly prepared or timid defense counsel, or a strong defense counsel to
take advantage of an inept or overworked prosecutor, there is a tendency to empha-
size the disparity of counsel, which has less impact when a case is heard in open
court, with all the attendant safeguards of a trial.
Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement at 4, United States v.
Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
William R. Wilson, Jr., counsel for Charles Yielding:
It is true that 'disparity of counsel' tends to weaken the plea agreement proce-
dure. . . .But it is also true that disparity of counsel undermines the entire judi-
cial process, and this counsel doubts that there is any less impact when there is a
trial on the merits.
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There are always defendants who are reluctant to plead guilty
to a lesser offense whether or not they actually committed the of-
fense with which they were charged. If the trial judge becomes in-
volved in the bargaining procedure, he may have a tendency to be
more lenient in sentencing a defendant who is cooperative and treat
more harshly one who refuses to enter a guilty plea. The following
statement by a judge to a defendant demonstrates the coercion that
can occur when the defendant seeks a trial:
As I see it, the likelihood of your being acquitted is not too
good. Of course, if you want a trial, you will certainly get a fair
trial. But you must remember this: If you are convicted as a second
offender of robbery in the first degree, you will be entitled to no
consideration of any kind from me.
Or do you want to take a plea to robbery in the second
degree and have some opportunity of receiving a shorter sentence?
If I sentence you after a conviction of robbery in the first degree,
you are going to be away until you are an old man.1
The threat to the defendant of sentence if he does not bargain is an
acknowledged abuse of the plea bargaining process. The Second
Circuit has held, however, that such a threat is not a denial of due
process; it is merely "a fair description of the consequences attend-
''47ant upon [a] prisoner's choice of plea .... ,
Motion for Reconsideration at 6, United States v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark., filed
Jan. 4, 1979).
Judge Eisele:
IDlisparity of counsel is a legitimate and reasonable factor to consider, I
believe, in deciding against entertaining plea bargaining. I do believe disparity is
really evened out, if a trial court is adequate to its duties, during the actual trial.
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration at 6, United States v. Yielding, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D.
Ark., held Jan. 5, 1979).
William R. Wilson, Jr., counsel for Charles Yielding:
While the District Court is of the opinion that this disparity has less impact
when the case is actually tried, Petitioner submits that the exact opposite is true.
A properly conducted plea agreement procedure requires the Court to interject
himself into the process, question the defendant at length, and then exercise his
discretion in deciding whether to accept the proposed plea agreement. It is highly
unlikely that a judge can fill in the gaps at a trial when counsel is ill-prepared -
it is too late.
Petitioner's Brief at 21, In re Yielding, No. 79-1093 (8th Cir. 1979).
46. United States ex rel. McGrath v. La Vallee, 319 F.2d 308, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1963). This
case and the ramifications of judicial interference are discussed in Official Inducements to
Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32 U. CI. L. REv. 167, 182 (1964).
47. United States ex rel. McGrath v. La Vallee, 319 F.2d 308, 314 (2d Cir. 1963). Federal
[Vol. 2
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The imposition of a lighter sentence when the defendant enters
a plea of guilty is so widespread that at least one court has taken
judicial notice of the practice.48 It has been noted that the admission
of guilt is a benefit to the defendant all its own: "This policy (of
sentencing persons who plead guilty with more leniency) might be
defended on the ground that a guilty plea indicates that the deter-
rent effect of the criminal law has begun to work upon a defendant
and that rehabilitative incarceration is not necessary in such a
case."49
A final problem that haunts both proponents and opponents of
plea bargaining is the fear that a defendant may be induced to plead
guilty when he is in fact innocent. This fear has been expressed by
many:
[T]here must be more than a lingering concern, when a nego-
tiated plea is heard, that an innocent defendant has been prevailed
upon, or has chosen to 'play the odds,' rather than to staunchly
maintain his innocence. In fact, must it not be accepted by the
proponents of plea bargaining that, statistically, a certain number
of innocent people will suffer judicial penalties because of that
system? . . . One can say that, in such situations, the defendant
is simply exercising rational choices affecting his self-interest.
That is true, and it may not be unreasonable for him to make such
a choice. But should the federal criminal justice system give an
innocent man that choice? This Court says, 'No.' [Judge Eisele]""
[T]he plea negotiation system creates a significant danger to
the innocent. Many of the rights it discourages are rights designed
to prevent the conviction of innocent defendants. To the extent
these rights are rendered non-operative by the plea negotiation
system, innocent defendants are endangered. [Moise Berger,
County Attorney, Maricopa County, Arizona] 5'
While plea bargaining thus reduces the inaccuracies and costs
of the traditional model, it also presents a danger that innocent
defendants will be tempted to plead guilty. Courts have attempted
to minimize this risk by inquiring into the factual basis for the
guilty plea before accepting it. This remedy is insufficient, though,
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e) outlines the plea agreement procedure to be used
and specifically states that the court shall not participate in any such plea discussions.
48. Dewey v. United States, 268 F.2d 124, 128 (8th Cir. 1959).
49. Adlerstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors, and Federal Courts: Some Recent
Problems, 6 HoFsTRA L. REv. 755, 781 (1978).
50. Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement at 7, United
States v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
51. Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621, 624 (1976).
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because defense counsel might advise their clients to admit in-
volvement in the crime in order not to jeopardize the bargain that
has already been struck. [Harvard Law Student]52
The prevalence of plea bargaining abuses in the federal courts
may be curtailed by the amendments to Rule 11 which were de-
signed to provide safeguards for defendants as parties to plea agree-
ments. 53 Under Rule 11 the judge must develop on the record the
factual basis for the plea and must assure himself that the plea is
made knowingly and without coercion before he accepts it.5"
Recognizing that plea discussions have in the past occurred in
a "largely invisible manner" and have been subject to almost no
"effective judicial review of the propriety of the agreement,"55 the
Committee and the Court agreed that the most effective means of
monitoring the bargaining process would be to require disclosure of
all the plea agreement terms in open court. The judge could thus
assure himself that a knowing" and voluntary" plea had been en-
tered by the defendant before the plea was accepted. Abuses result-
ing in unwitting constitutional waivers by the defendant and
coerced pleas could thus be largely removed from the bargaining
process.
Most of the public cynicism concerning the plea bargaining
process may be eliminated when the "back room" implications of
plea bargaining are overcome by exposing the entire agreement to
judicial scrutiny. The abuses that result from unequal representa-
tion will hopefully be removed as well.58 Rule 11 may also eliminate
a major headache for the federal courts: collateral attacks by a
defendant who claims that the terms of his plea agreement were not
honored and carried out by the prosecutor as agreed. The United
52. Note, Plea Bargaining & the Transformation of the Criminal Process, supra note
14, at 574 (footnotes omitted).
53. Hungate, Changes in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 61 A.B.A.J. 1203
(1975). The Eighth Circuit has recognized the purpose of Rule 11(e) in United States v.
Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124 (1977):
Rule 11(e) was designed to recognize the legal validity of bargained pleas, to
regulate the plea bargaining process, and to eliminate at least some of the problems
that have arisen and some of the abuses that have occurred in connection with the
process.
Id. at 1129.
54. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
55. FED. R. CraM. P. 11 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1974 Amendment).
56. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
57. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d).
58. This was the claim of the counsel for Charles Yielding in Petitioner's Brief at 21,
In re Yielding, No. 79-1093 (8th Cir. 1979).
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States Supreme Court has held that the terms of a plea bargain
must be enforced as reflected in the agreement."0 The amendments
to Rule 11 should aid in the implementation of plea agreements and
the sentence agreed upon because the terms of the agreement will
have been set forth in their entirety on the record before the court
and the court may assist in their enforcement. In advocating the
disclosure on the record of plea agreements, one court noted that:
"Compliance with this procedure should avoid ostensible claims by
defendants of unfairness in the guilty plea process and minimize the
escalating number of cases complaining of aborted plea bargains,
involuntary pleas, or frustrated plea expectations."6'
The Judge's Role Under Rule 11
The issue raised by a court's ban on the presentation of plea
agreements is not whether such bargains should be accepted or re-
jected. Clearly, under Rule 11, there is no obligation on the part of
a judge to accept any recommendation or bargain reached by the
parties.6 ' The problem concerns the judge's discretion as to whether
he will even consider proposed plea agreements. Specifically at issue
is the interpretation of the word "shall" in Rule 11(e)(2):
If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties the court
shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open
court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the
plea is offered. Thereupon the court may accept or reject the agree-
ment, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection
until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence
report."6
Counsel for the petitioner in the Yielding case contended that Rule
11(e)(2) required the judge to hear an agreed-upon plea. Judge Ei-
sele's interpretation, however, is that it is entirely within the discre-
tion of the judge as to whether the mere presentation of plea agree-
ments will be allowed in his court. At war here are the "plain mean-
59. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
60. United States v. Dixon, 504 F.2d 69, 72 (3rd Cir. 1974). However, until the Supreme
Court interprets Rule 11(e)(2), the slack in collateral attacks based on failure to implement
plea agreements may be taken up by an increase in cases such as the Yielding petition, based
on a judge's failure to hear the plea agreement.
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(2). See also United States v. Dixon, 504 F.2d 69 (3rd Cir.
1974), where the court said: "The court, of course, is not obligated to accept any recommenda-
tion or bargain reached by the parties and it should so inform the defendant when any bargain
is disclosed." Id. at 72.
62. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(e)(2)(emphasis added).
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ing" rule of statutory construction and the legislative history to Rule
11.
A statutory interpretation of Rule 11 favoring an obligatory
hearing of all plea bargaining has been advanced by some defense
counsel and prosecutors. 3 To apply this plain meaning rule of statu-
tory construction there must be no ambiguity in the statutory lan-
guage in question. It has been argued that no such ambiguity exists
in Rule 11(e)(2),11 which provides that the judge shall require the
disclosure of a plea agreement when one has been reached between
the parties.
The United States Supreme Court has waxed hot and cold in
its application of the plain meaning rule. In Caminetti v. United
States"5 the Court stated the following:
[W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final
expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or
subtracted from by considerations drawn from titles or designating
names or reports accompanying their introduction, or from any
extraneous source. In other words, the language being plain, and
not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is
the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent."
The Court has declared later, however, that "when aid to construc-
tion of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available,
there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however
63. Petitioner's Brief, In re Yielding, No. 79-1093 (8th Cir. 1979).
64. "The Rule does not state, or imply, directly or indirectly, that this is the procedure
a judge shall follow 'if he permits presentation of plea agreements to him. Nowhere in the
Rule does any ambiguity exist." Motion for Reconsideration at 8, United States v. Griffin,
No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
Judge Eisele has refuted this contention:
[Tlhere is implicitly an ambiguity in Rule 11 if one states that, assuming that
there is an obligation, a mandatory obligation, to permit counsel to bring before
the Court a plea bargain, that the Court on the other hand has absolute authority
to disregard it, out of hand, without any abuse of discretion, then the pertinency
of the legislative history becomes obvious, and it would suggest that this useless
exercise should, or could, be avoided or that judges should not be required to go
through it unless they are required under certain circumstances to accept plea
bargains.
If they are not required to accept them, if they can deny them and ignore them
on grounds of principle as opposed to the particular facts and circumstances, then
it is obvious to the Court that the ambiguity that requires reference to the legisla-
tive history is there.
Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration at 8, United States v. Yielding, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D.
Ark. 1979).
65. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
66. Id. at 490.
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clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination'." 7
There are those who claim the plain meaning rule is invoked by
the courts to "consciously or unconsciously" frustrate the intention
of the legislature."5 Others claim that neither the rule nor legislative
history should be considered, but the "judicial application of the
statute law should be governed rather by the personal conviction of
the judge with respect to the worth of the competing interests in-
volved in particular controversies."" Judge Learned Hand gave the
plain meaning rule a short and decisive slap when he said: "There
is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally." 0
If the plain meaning rule is not invoked and one looks to the
legislative history of Rule 11, Judge Eisele's policy rests on firmer
ground. The following statements appear in the history of Rule 11:
The Supreme Court amendments to Rule 11(e) establish a
plea agreement procedure. ... The procedure is not mandatory;
a court is free not to permit the parties to present plea agreements
to it. The Advisory Committee stressed during its testimony that
the rule does not mandate that a court permit any form of plea
agreement to be presented to it."
The language of the statute can arguably be said to reflect the
intention of the Committee and the Committee apparently intended
that judges have total discretion in receiving plea bargains.72 A
judge's right to refuse to hear plea agreements was discussed at
length in both the committee hearings and in correspondence. Judge
67. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).
68. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Inter-
pretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1975). However, the
British courts follow the rule to such an extent that any resort to legislative history is forbid-
den. Id. at 1301.
69. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939).
70. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944).
71. FED. R. CuMm. P. 11(e) (Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No.
94-247).
72. Id. In accord with this view of statutory interpretation is Murphy, Old Maxims
Never Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. Rav. 1299 (1975), where it was stated:
If Congress can be said to have an intention at all in such a case it must be the
intention of its Committees; thus the Committee report must mean that such
evidence must always be accepted . . . .One can symphathize with the idea that
it would have been better to have amended the bill in the first instance. But the
workings of the legislative process are such that it frequently is not feasible to




William H. Webster,13 for example, wrote a letter to Hon. Frank A.
Kaufman" in which he expressed the following:
I find that many judges throughout the country perceive the
proposed rule as somehow requiring them to permit plea agree-
ments in their courtrooms to the full extent authorized by the rule.
This is simply not the case, and it's probably the fault of those of
us who drafted the rule that the reservation of discretion in the
trial judge is not more apparent. . . . We thought it was reasona-
bly evident that a trial judge could make it clear to the prosecutor
that he was not interested in receiving plea agreements . . . if that
were in fact the case . . . . It was our conclusion that the trial
judge was thus accorded complete discretion to preclude plea bar-
gaining in his court, toaccept certain types of plea bargaining or
to permit the entire range of plea bargaining, depending upon the
state of his docket, the reliability of the prosecutor and the trial
judge's own sense of propriety. 5
Courts are not required to accept any plea agreements. At least
one writer, however, has adopted the view that "Now, under Rule
11, the trial judge, while not required to accept any plea agreement,
must at least consider it."16 Judge Eisele obviously interpreted the
Committee's intention to be in accord with his ruling since he an-
swered the request for presentation of the Yielding plea with this
response: "[Tihe Advisory Committee of Criminal Rules of the
Judicial Conference of the United States stressed that the Rule does
not require a court to permit any form of plea agreement to be
presented to it.""
73. Then of the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
74. United States District Judge, Baltimore, Maryland.
75. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the
Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted
in [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 674, 678-79 n. 7a.
76. Hoffman, Pleas of Guilty in the Federal Courts, 22 PRAc. L. 13, 16 (Sept. 1976).
77. Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement at 3, United
States v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1978). In Case No. 79-1093, filed May 21, 1979,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to order Judge Eisele to
consider the plea bargaining agreement in the Yielding case. The Eighth Circuit concluded
that since Rule 11(e)(2) gives the court the right to accept or reject the plea bargain, "it would
be a useless act to require a district judge to listen to the agreement when he has already
decided to exercise his right of rejection under Rule 11(e)(2)."
The Fourth Circuit agreed with this interpretation when a circuit judge in the Western
District of North Carolina imposed a ban similar to Judge Eisele's. In United States v.
Stamey, 569 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1978), the defendant was charged on three counts of bank
robbery and reached an agreement with the government that led to his pleading guilty to one
indictment in return for a dismissal of the other two. Concerned that plea bargaining in that
district had gone too far, the district court announced prior to trial that plea bargaining
agreements no longer would be recognized. Because of this ban no disclosure of the full
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The controversy generated by the refusal to hear plea agree-
ments may be reduced to one essential question: Is plea bargaining
a necessary process? While recognizing its flaws, the United States
Supreme Court has regarded plea bargaining with approval:
Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is
that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are
important components of this country's criminal justice system.
Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned."i
Other courts have agreed that plea bargaining serves a valid purpose
in the adjudicative process and that plea agreements should not be
entirely excluded in the federal district courts. In Bryan v. United
States" the Fifth Circuit articulated its view that plea agreements
should be considered, even if ultimately rejected:
Thirty days after the date of this opinion all district courts in
this circuit shall put into effect the following supplementary prac-
tices at the time of taking pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. The
court shall state that plea agreements are permissible and that the
defendant and all counsel have a duty to disclose the existence and
details of any agreement which relates to the plea tendered. Spe-
cific inquiry shall be made as to the existence of such an agreement
before a plea is accepted.81
Judge Eisele is among those critics who feel that plea bargain-
ing is not necessary.8' Commentators have expressed the idea that
"Plea bargaining runs counter to the system (of justice) devised by
our forefathers. ' 82 In accord is the following view:
"Stuff and nonsense" was Alice in Wonderland's response to
the idea that the sentence should come first and the verdict and
trial later. Plea bargaining carries the logic of the Queen of Hearts
agreement was made in open court.
The defendant was tried and convicted on all three counts. On appeal the sole issue was
"whether, under Rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the trial judge
must consider the substance of a plea bargaining agreement before he decides whether to
accept the defendant's plea of guilty." Id. at 806.
The court looked to the legislative history in determining that it had no duty to permit
plea bargaining and was not required to consider the substance of Stamey's agreement with
the government. Id.
78. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
79. 492 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. Id. at 781.
81. Memorandum and Order Denying Motion to Hear Plea Agreement, United States
v. Griffin, No. LR-CR-77-9 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
82. Clark, Plea Bargaining: A Primer for Defense Counsel, 9 CUM. L. Rav. 1, 22 (1978).
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one step farther. It is sentence first, and never mind about the trial
and verdict. They are eliminated from the system."
Various proposals for reform of the plea bargaining system have
been made. These include a plea screening hearing before an inves-
tigative magistrate prior to the plea bargaining session;4 greater
participation by the defendant in the plea discussions;"5 lower fees
for the attorney when the case does not go to trial;"8 and the insist-
ence that a possible bargain never be offered in exchange for a plea
when the same results would obtain without the plea.87
Two issues should be dealt with by a court before it implements
a policy resulting in an absolute ban on the presentation, considera-
tion and acceptance of plea agreements. First, it is important that
sentences be tailored to each individual defendant and yet remain
equal for similarly situated defendants. Those determining the sent-
ence must be free to consider the circumstances of the crime and
the degree of deterrence or rehabilitation that is necessary, among
various other factors. The court should consider whether this can
best be done by trial or by bargain.
Second, serious consideration must be given to whether rejec-
tion of all plea bargains would have the ultimate effect of driving
the plea bargain back underground. It was this fear that prompted
83. Id. The statement was made by the executive director of the American Civil Liber-
ties Union.
84. Note, Plea Bargaining & the Transformation of the Criminal Process, supra note
14, at 565.
85. This step has since been taken by the U.S. Attorney's office that was involved in
the plea in the Yielding case. In each case the prosecutor will sit down with the defendant
and defense counsel and go over all the points in the prospective plea agreement to make
certain the defendant understands the decision that is reached. See Exhibit A.
86. Alschuler, supra note 30, at 1199. This would put the squeeze on the "cop-out
lawyers," but would also mean an attorney might have to go through the fee-collection process
in two steps if he did go to trial.
87. For example, the Memorandum to the Legal Staff of the District Attorney's Office,
August 14, 1974, put out by Richard H. Kuh, District Attorney, New York County, New York,
states:
Frequently defendants will be arrested and charged with felonies, ... but the
gravity of the cases will not require that they be treated as felons. Sometimes in
the past this type of charge has been reduced to misdemeanor status in the Criminal
Court only if the defendants express their willingness to plead guilty to misdemean-
ors promptly as a condition of such reductions.
Insofar as that has been the practice, it tends to deprive defendants of their
right to trial in cases in which-hypothetically-equitably the misdemeanor
charge, not a felony charge, is appropriate.
If a case is worthy of misdemeanor treatment only, it is ordinarily to be
accorded such even though the defendant has not expressed his willingness to plead
guilty.
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the amendments to Rule 11.8 Proper attention to the dictates of
Rule 11 should eliminate most of the abuses that have co-existed
with "behind the scenes" plea bargaining. As expressed by the Ad-
visory Committee: "Failure to recognize it (plea bargaining) tends
not to destroy it but to drive it underground. We reiterate what we
have said before: that when plea bargaining occurs it ought to be
spread on the record . . . and publicly disclosed.""5 This admoni-
tion should be considered carefully by the Bench and the Bar.
88. FED. R. Cram. P. 11 (Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1974 Amendment).
89. Id. This same fear is expressed in Comment, New Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 11(e): Dangers in Restricting the Judicial Role in Sentencing Agreements, 14 AM. CraM.
L. REv. 305 (1976), where the author warns: "[If this rule fosters secret negotiations between
prosecutors and defense attorneys and their clients seeking to avoid its strictures, the lauda-
ble legislative goals of the new procedure will be frustrated." Id. at 318 (footnotes omitted).
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Exhibit A
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS







RULE 11 PLEA NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 11 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the attorney for the government and
attorney for the defendant , have engaged
in discussions and have reached an agreement which contem-
plates the entry of a plea of guilty by this defendant to
of the above-captioned indictment.
1. Upon acceptance of such plea of guilty, the attorney for
the government agrees to
2. The defendant states that he understands that his plea
agreement and a recommendation for sentence to be made by
the government is not binding on the Court, but if the Court re-
jects the plea agreement, the defendant will be offered an op-
portunity by the Court to withdraw his plea of guilty and go to
trial. In the event that the defendant does not wish to withdraw
his guilty plea and persists in that plea, the Court may impose
any sentence allowable under the laws of the United States in-
cluding a sentence less favorable to the defendant than that
contemplated by the plea agreement.
3. The defendant also states that he understands that he
has an absolute right to plead not guilty and persist in that
plea, that he has a right to be tried by a jury and at that trial he
has a right to the assistance of counsel.
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4. At any trial of the case, he has a right to require the
government to prove the entire case against him beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that he has the right not to testify against himself
or not to be compelled to incriminate himself. Further, at any
trial, the defendant would have the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him and to present witnesses in
his own behalf. Furthermore, the defendant understands that
by pleading guilty he waives the right to a trial, that no trial
will in fact occur and that the only thing remaining to be done
in the case is the imposition of sentence.
5. The defendant and his attorney both state that this
agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the defen-
dant and the government and that no promises or inducements
have been made, directly or indirectly, by an agent of the United
States, including any Assistant United States Attorney, con-
cerning any plea to be entered in this case. In addition, the
defendant states that no person has, directly or indirectly,
threatened or coerced the defendant to do or refrain from doing
anything in connection with any aspect of this case, including
entering a plea of guilty.
6. Counsel for the defendant states that he has read this
statement, been given a copy of it for his file, explained it to
his client, and states that to the best of his knowledge and be-
lief the defendant understands it. Furthermore, if any statements
are made by the Assistant United States Attorney or any other
government agent at any time in the future which are at vari-
ance with the contents of this statement, counsel will notify the
United States Attorney in writing of the details thereof within
two days after the statement is made.
7. The defendant states that he has read this statement-
has had this statement read to him-has discussed it with his




Assistant United States Attorney
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